European defence cooperation by Nunes, Isabel Ferreira
 48 Nação e Defesa
European Defence  Cooperat ion
2018
N.º 150
pp. 48-75
Abstract 
The article offers a view on the state of events and 
initiatives leading to recent developments in Euro-
pean defence cooperation from June 2016 – when 
the EU Global Strategy was presented – till June 
2018 – when a call for the evaluation of progress of 
PESCO projects was endorsed by the Council. It 
argues that despite being presented as an inclusive 
and binding endeavour, European defence cooper-
ation comprises political, technological and opera-
tional standards, which are not accessible to all 
Member States for reasons of national interest, 
technological and industrial gap and operational 
output. However, the developments of the past two 
years seem to have been having an incremental 
effect on defence cooperation, regarding the identi-
fication and agreement on strategic priorities and 
the development of financial incentives and pro-
cesses that may consolidate European defence 
cooperation, as claimed by the EUGS.
Resumo 
Cooperação Europeia no Domínio da Defesa
O artigo é uma perspetiva sobre a evolução de aconteci-
mentos e iniciativas conducentes ao desenvolvimento da 
cooperação no domínio da defesa no período compreen-
dido entre Junho de 2016, quando a Estratégia Global foi 
apresentada, até junho de 2018 altura em que o Conselho 
decidiu a avaliação do progresso dos projetos de Coope- 
ração Estruturada Permanente. Considera que, pese 
embora o carácter inclusivo e vinculativo deste projeto 
cooperativo, o mesmo compreende requisitos políticos, 
tecnológicos e operacionais, não acessíveis a todos os 
Estados-Membros por razões de interesse nacional, 
atraso tecnológico e industrial ou desempenho operacio-
nal. Contudo os recentes desenvolvimentos dos últimos 
dois anos parecem estar a ter um efeito incremental sobre 
a cooperação no domínio da defesa no que respeita à iden-
tificação e acordo incremental sobre as prioridades estra-
tégicas da União e sobre os incentivos financeiros e pro-
cessuais, que poderão contribuir para consolidar a 
cooperação no quadro da defesa europeia, tal como refe-
rido na Estratégia Global da UE. 
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“I have always believed that Europe would be built through crisis and 
that it would be the sum of their solution”
Jean Monet (1978, p. 421)
During the European Council of December 2013, Member States representatives 
acknowledged that the changing strategic environment called for a better develop-
ment of European capabilities, asserting that “defence matters” (European Council, 
2013, §1) and that more attention and investment should be placed on European 
defence. Three years later, on the 28th of June 2016, the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) presented to Member States the 
document “European Union Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and 
Security Policy” (EUGS), an introduction caught up by the result of the British refe-
rendum that would set the process of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the 
European Union. Despite the setback marked by the fact the European Council did 
not formally endorsed the EUGS and one of the Union’s strategically most capable 
Member State decided to leave the organization, the EU and NATO reaffirmed their 
willingness to improve European and transatlantic security and defense coope- 
ration, with the approval of a Joint Declaration between the two organizations. 
Conversely to 2003, when the European Security Strategy was approved, in 2016 in 
different stages and at different paces the European Union, its Member States and 
its strategic partners presented a united diplomatic front, as a reaction to the 
external events that could have led to further fragmentation of interests, with 
consequences over European foreign, security and defence policy. On the 25th of 
June of 2018, the European Council emphasized the importance of security and 
defence cooperation to the strengthening of EU’s “capacity to act as a security 
provider, its strategic autonomy, and its ability to cooperate with partners” (Council 
of the European Union, 2018/402), reiterating the goals and targets set earlier by 
the EUGS regarding the internal and international responsibilities of the Union.
This article offers a comprehensive view on the evolution of events and initiatives 
leading to recent developments in European defence cooperation from June 2016, 
when the EU Global Strategy was presented, till June 2018, when a call for the 
evaluation of progress of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects was 
endorsed by the Council. It argues that despite being presented as an inclusive and 
binding endeavour, European defence cooperation comprises political, technolo-
gical and operational standards, which are not accessible to all Member States for 
reasons of national interest, technological and industrial gap and operational 
output. However, the developments of the past two years seem to have been having 
an incremental effect on defence cooperation, regarding de identification and agre-
ement on strategic priorities and the development of incentives and rewards that 
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may contribute to the strategic autonomy of the European Union, as claimed by the 
EUGS. 
The Institutional Setting of European Defence 
In current international affairs and to the majority of international actors coopera-
tion is no longer a matter of choice, but a necessity due to the transnational effects 
of instability and insecurity, which transformed the traditional sovereign domains 
of security and defense into a more interdependent policy domain, not only from 
each other but also with other policy domains. The combined consequences of 
current threats and the growing exposure of both states and international organiza-
tions to public scrutiny, turns collaborative practice into a much needed instrument 
that adds legitimacy to external action and increases the amount of instruments 
and resources available to international and regional actors. When cooperative 
practice involves major strategic players and long standing organizations, such as 
the European Union and NATO, it has better chances of dealing successfully with 
the uncertainties of systemic instability, strengthening institutions and operational 
circumstances to better deal with risks through responsibility sharing in external 
crisis management and conflict management1. 
When international organizations and states commit to cooperative frameworks 
this facilitates access to specialized knowledge, information and resources like 
capabilities, whether one refers to the possibility of the EU to use command, control 
and planning structures of NATO or NATO access to EU specific civilian proficien-
cies in crisis management contexts.
In order for cooperation to happen, political will must be strengthened on the 
base of common perceptions of risks, interests and opportunities or through a stra-
tegic imperative to react. This is not a technical detail, sometimes not even a finan-
cial one. It is a choice that shapes the opportunity for states and organizations to 
engage collective as international actors, in crisis response. Frequently, academics 
and practitioners deny the EU the status of an international actor, whether by 
stressing its inability to perform traditional state like competences in external 
action, based on sovereignty, territory and coercion or by comparing it to other 
security actors such as NATO, which as a defense organization is centered on the 
military dimension of international security2. Through CSDP, the EU aims at projec-
1 Despite the fact favourable institutional and operational conditions may be present, leading to 
better coordination and cooperation, the presence of multiple actors brings representativeness 
of interests, preferences (Moravcsik, 1991; 1997) and traditions of foreign policy into the secu-
rity and defense equation, which conditions the degree of political commitment and opera-
tional engagement of self-interested players.
2 See also Hyde-Price (2006) and Ojanen (2006).
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ting a more constitutive3, rather than confrontational security and strategic culture. 
International actorness means that with the consensus of its constitutive parts that 
is, its Member States and external partners, the EU exercises governance in a way 
that projects influence and changes behavioral patterns among its constitutive parts 
enabling or leading to cooperative practices (Nunes, 2017, p. 45).
Cooperation is likely to work better in an interdependent security environment, 
where resources are scarce, too expensive to be individually owned or unevenly 
distributed, but fragmentation of threats has a wide spread effect over all.
As the European project evolves, the European Union tends to strengthen its exe- 
cutive, legislative and deliberative powers mimicking state like actors, which is 
likely to pose problems of consistency between policy formulation and policy 
implementation on European defence given it has to aggregate the preferences of 
28, now 27 Member States. 
With the ratification of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), the Union sought 
to strengthen consistency and coherence of its external policy and external repre-
sentation with the establishment of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy in charge of leading the Union’s foreign and security 
policy fulfilling its executive functions at the highest level of foreign policy and 
security policy, a role complemented by the integration of the national diplomatic 
services of Member States under the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
seeking to develop a European diplomatic culture, a more efficient international 
engagement and in time a European common defence4.
In 2003 the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) identified the chal-
lenges and risks that affected the EU and outlined the strategic objectives to safe-
guard Europe’s security. This was followed in 2004 by the establishment of the 
European Defense Agency (EDA), created to help developing Europe’s defence 
capabilities and support the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDC)5.
In 12 July 2004, the European Council6 with the extinction of the Western European 
Union and the creation of EDA, would endorse an expansion of the designated 
Petersberg Missions7 (TEU, Article 43) from its initial scope, comprising crisis 
3 See also Eckes (2015).
4 With the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament was granted greater power to monitor the 
High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission’s action thus reducing 
the established idea of democratic deficit.
5 As designated until 2007, date when the Lisbon Treaty was signed and ESDC took the designa-
tion Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
6 See Council of the European Union (2004).
7 Agreed during the ministerial summit of the Council of the Western European Union in 19 June 
1992.
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management, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, rescue 
missions and employment of combat forces in crisis management, adding to its 
tasks portfolio joint disarmament operations, military assistance, security sector 
reform, post conflict stabilization, fight against terrorism and the development of 
the civilian dimension of ESDP. 
In 2009, Permanent Structured Cooperation did not emerged from a specific 
concern with the identification of traditional threats or enemies, but from the need 
to secure and strengthen Europe’s interests in the face of external security 
challenges. PESCO, as confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty Declaration on PESCO, 
introduced a method of cooperation structured around a flexible mechanism of 
participation in European defence, which was meant to work as a vehicle of func-
tional compensation, in case negative deliberation by Member States occurred 
regarding decisions with impact on security and defence. As Vimont (2018, p. 7) 
observes, flexible provisions have to “take into account the need to safeguard the 
solidarity principle that remains the bedrock of EU cooperation” therefore should 
not be used in a way that weakens the purpose of further integration of willing 
Member States. The relaunch of PESCO on the 11 December 2017, led the Council 
to adopt a decision establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation, shortly after 
receiving a joint notification by twenty three Member States expressing their inten-
tion to participate in joint defence cooperation8.
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDC) was renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with the 
intent to further collective action of Member States and introduced PESCO as an 
inclusive cooperative initiative. 
From the institutional point of view, CSDP came out reinforced with the Treaty of 
the European Union with the introduction of five mechanisms: two of imperative 
nature and three of flexible order. Those of imperative nature came under the form 
of a Solidarity Clause (TEU Article 222) bound by the political pressures generated 
by the terrorist attacks in Madrid 2004 and specifically designed to encourage joint 
action of Member States in case a “Member State is the object or the victim of a 
natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its 
disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States 
to respond to terrorist threat, protect democratic institutions and civilians and 
assist Member States in their territories in the event of a natural or man-made 
disaster”. Further, the Treaty states that “The Council shall act in accordance with 
8 Pierre Haroche (2017, p. 231) argues that European defence cooperation seeks primarily to 
respond and solve problems of inter-European interdependence triggered by the impact of 
international crises. See also Simón (2017, pp. 192-197).
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Article 31(1)9 of the Treaty on European Union, [noting] where this decision has 
defence implications” (TEU Article 222, §3), the Council would not exercise legisla-
tive functions. The Council would adopt a decision acting on a joint proposal by the 
European Commission and the High Representative and the European Parliament 
would be informed.
The Mutual Assistance Clause10 according to Article 42(7) of the TEU agreed under 
the “Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy” states that “If a 
Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member 
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in 
their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”. However 
not all Member States are able to fulfill this commitment for political or operational 
circumstances to do so. As Bakker (2017, p. 2) refers, within NATO “the Mutual 
assistance commitment is backed by a common practice of planning, training 
and exercises, whereas within the EU, under Article 42(7) this is not the case. This 
shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of 
certain Member States” for instance regarding the Scandinavian countries, notably 
Denmark which does not take part on the defence dimension of CSDP. The Treaty 
foresees that commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with 
responsibilities assumed under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which, for 
those States which are NATO allies, remains the foundation of their collective 
defence and the main forum for its implementation (Article 42, §2 and §7). The 
importance of these provisions of the Treaty pertains also to the fact it authorizes 
CSDP bodies to act militarily within the Union’s territory.
For those other flexible arrangements, they allow groups of Member States to 
further cooperation and integration, whenever the Union as a whole does not wish 
or cannot pursue collectively. “Enhanced Cooperation” is one of these flexible 
mechanisms foreseen in the Treaty through which a formal delegation of tasks can 
be given to a specific group of Member States by the Council, a decision meant to 
improve the Union’s external position, allowing a group of willing Member States 
to take forward a decision, declaring in its Article 327 that “Any enhanced coopera-
tion shall respect the competences, rights and obligations of those Member States 
which do not participate in it. Those Member States shall not impede its implemen-
9 Article 15b (1) of the TEU states that “The European Council shall provide the Union with the 
necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and 
priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions”.
10 The Mutual Assistance Clause was invoked for the first time, since the Treaty of the European 
Union ratification, on the 17th of November 2015 by France, in the follow up of the events 
related with terrorist acts in Paris occurred on the 13th of November.
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tation by the participating Member States”11. According to Article 20 of the TEU, 
Member States may establish enhanced cooperation “within the framework of the 
Union’s non-exclusive competences”, with the aim to protect European interests 
and strengthen the integration process. The Council adopts the decision authori-
zing enhanced cooperation, whenever the cooperation cannot be undertaken 
“within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole” by at least nine Member 
States, providing functional flexibility to policy implementation on the base of 
willing Member States.
The Treaty also foresees that specific missions can be delegated by the Council to a 
Member State in the preservation of the interests of the Union in the context of the 
“Framework Nation” concept (Article 44)12. This provision enables a Member State 
to assume “specific responsibilities in an EU-led military operation or mission over 
which the EU exercises political control and strategic direction, after Council deci-
sion” (EEAS, 2015, §8), notably the capacity of setting headquarters, complemen-
ting the functional flexibility offered by Enhanced Cooperation and Permanent 
Structured Cooperation, in situations requiring a rapid response. 
The last flexible mechanism regards Permanent Structured Cooperation. Despite, 
its inclusive essence PESCO is formally limited by eligibility criteria of normative 
nature, through the institutionalization of a permanent commitment and by a 
functional criteria13, through the requisite of previous participation of Member 
States in missions and operations at the operational high end. In order to soften the 
idea of competition, and in line with Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, PESCO 
framework was introduced as compatible with the responsibilities assumed in the 
context of other organizations and without implications over the specific character 
of national security and defence policies of Member States.
11 The status of “participating Member States” is for the moment limited to EU Member States who 
are at least engaged in one European defence cooperation project led by the European Defence 
Agency. For PESCO projects the treaty set the requirement for a minimum of nine participating 
Member States. For third countries, cooperation is being envisaged, but in the field of research 
and innovation regarding defence products, access to technologies is limited to EU Member 
States. In the UK case, after March 2019, contracts with the British “with any manner of sensitive 
content will be terminated” (Directorate-General for External Policies, 2018, p. 32), which will 
pose a legal challenge to their participation in defense projects. See also Nunes (2017a, pp. 120-
122). The United Kingdom on a position paper regarding the vision for the government on 
foreign, security and defence policy cooperation with the EU outlines its conditional to take part 
on defence initiatives, if it can “work with the EU during mandate development and detailed 
operational planning”, see also United Kingdom Government (2017, p. 19, §72).
12 The concept of Framework Nation regards the “conceptual basis for the planning, launch and 
conduct of autonomous EU-led military operation/mission where there is a FN” (framework 
nation), see EEAS (2015, p. 5). 
13 See also Koening and Walter-Franke (2017, p. 13).
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The provisions on Permanent Structured Cooperation, as referred to in Article 
42(6) approved in 2007 comprehend eight goals. The first regarded the improve-
ment of defence capacities through the development of “contributions and partici-
pation in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes 
and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, 
research, acquisition and armaments” (Article 1(a), Protocol 10 to the TEU). The 
second, to develop the capacity to supply by 2010, either at the national level or as 
part of a multinational force groups, combat units for missions planned and struc-
tured at a tactical level as battle groups (Idem, Article 1(b)). The third, to increase 
participation with support elements, including transport and logistic capable of 
carrying missions within a period of 5 to 30 days in response to requests from the 
United Nations, which could be sustained for an initial period of 30 days extended 
up to 120 days (Idem, ibidem) setting forward the limits underlining the develop-
ment of the Headline Goal 2010. The fourth, to bring the respective defence appa-
ratus into line with each other as far as possible by harmonizing, pooling and 
specializing14 their defence capabilities, encouraging defence cooperation in the 
field of training and logistics (Article 2(b), Protocol 10). The fifth, to take measures 
to improve availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of forces 
(Article 2(c), Protocol 10) that could guarantee the projection of security and 
defence of Europe’s interest. 
The large majority of these goals regarded military defence, a trend which PESCO 
framework in 2017 came to confirm. Despite the fact currently the number of CSDP 
civilian missions being higher than military operations, from the seventeen PESCO 
projects15, adopted by participating Member States, eight have a military focus 
and nine may have dual use or more specific civilian purpose16. The sixth was to 
identify and overcome the shortfalls perceived in the context of the “Capability 
Development Mechanism”. The seventh to take part, where appropriate in the 
14 This assumes multilateral cooperation as a given fact, because Member States would become 
more interdependent.
15 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) first collaborative projects – Overview. Available 
at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32079/pesco-overview-of-first-collaborative-of-
projects-for-press.pdf. Portugal will take part in five projects: European Secure Software 
Defined Radio; Military Mobility; Maritime (semi)Autonomous Systems for Mine Counter-
measures; Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform; and Strategic 
Command and Control System for CSDP Missions and Operations. See Council of the Euro-
pean Union (6393/18) Council Decision establishing the list of projects to be developed under 
PESCO. Brussels, 1 March.
16 At the time when the Treaty was ratified, the Protocol on PESCO would recall providing the 
Union with the operational capacity drawing on “civilian and military assets”. In 2017 in a total 
of 16 CSDP missions, ten are civilian missions and six military operations. See EEAS (2017a).
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development of major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework 
of the European Defence Agency (Article 2(e), Protocol 10).
The Protocol safeguards that Member States have both the political and operational 
control over the capabilities to be made available in a PESCO framework and that 
they do not interfere with the security and defence “obligations under the North 
Atlantic Treaty“. The tasks to be performed are to be “undertaken using the capabi-
lities provided by the Member States in accordance with the principle of a single set 
of forces” (Protocol 10), ensuring the integrity of the commitments assumed in the 
context of other international organizations and guaranteeing that no overlap or 
duplication occurs. Finally, the Treaty anticipated the creation of a startup fund for 
the launch of peacekeeping operations of CSDP, with the aim to provide the finan-
cial autonomy and the capacity for rapid response.
While the Solidarity Clause and Mutual Assistance Clause offer the legally binding 
agreement among Member States that wish to express political will to collective 
support its peers in situation of crisis and conflict. The mechanisms of Enhanced 
Cooperation, Framework Nation and Permanent Structured Cooperation were 
perhaps perceived by the legislators as opportunities to overcome the difficulties 
foreseen ahead in the development of European defence cooperation, thus creating 
cooperative alternative and flexible mechanisms, through which some Member 
States could pursue flexible collective action, in those circumstances where full 
collective action was difficult or impossible.
“Defense Matters”
Several reasons may account for the difficulties experienced in launching defence 
cooperation between 2009 (when the Lisbon Treaty was ratified) and 2017 when a 
Council Decision on the 11th December 2018 established for the first time a Perma-
nent Structured Cooperation17. These ranged from difficulty in agreeing on common 
objectives for CSDP, due to the presence of distinct national interests and perspec-
tives on legality and legitimacy in external action, to different perceptions of imme-
diate risk and threat. 
These circumstances were aggravated by the events that followed the decisions 
to intervene in Afghanistan and Iraq and later by the consequences of the ‘Arab 
Spring’ movement, the Eurozone crisis, the revisionist turn in Russia’s foreign 
policy with the intervention in Crimea, the multinational military actions in 
Libya and Mali, the escalation of the refugee crisis, the beginning of the negotia-
tions laying out the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the UE and Trump’s 
17 See Council of the European Union (2017/2315). The list of participating Member States is in 
Official Journal of the European Union, L331/57-77, 14 December.
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election. These external events18 had a considerable influence on the decisions 
leading to Europe seeking a stronger regional and international role. 
The long period that mediates between 2009 and 2018 has been marked by the 
uncertainty of the European project in general and european defence in particular, 
but it has also been a period of acknowledgement that an interdependent interna-
tional security environment requires better cooperation.
The presentation on the 28th June 2016 by the High Representative of the EU Global 
Strategy, placed defence at the centre of the European agenda, an initiative that was 
strengthen on the 8th July 2016 by the “EU-NATO Joint Declaration” signed by the 
Presidents of the European Council, European Commission and the Secretary 
General of NATO, manifesting an united front among main political European 
actors and transatlantic allies in face of the divisive political context that marked 
the year. Further, the EU Global Strategy reviewed the military level of ambition 
calling for a “sectoral strategy to be agreed by the Council” and specified “the civil-
-military level of ambition, tasks, requirements and capability priorities stemming 
from this Strategy” (EU Global Strategy, 2016) with three main objectives: to protect 
the European citizens leading to increase cooperation between internal and external 
security; to respond to external crises through more intense and efficient coopera-
tion that fosters resilience; and to strengthen capacities of partners and with part-
ners transforming formal political pledges into cooperative actions. The informal 
meeting of Defence Ministers in Bratislava paved the agreement between EU 
Defence Ministers on a roadmap to further European defence, an initiative that 
would be consolidated with High Representative Mogherini’s proposal on an 
“Implementation Plan on Security and Defence” (High Representative, 2016/14392). 
The Implementation Plan on Security and Defence set out the level of ambition 
based on the agreement between EU Foreign and Defense Ministers on how to 
develop European security and defence policy, in straight consonance with the 
European Commission adoption of a “European Defence Action Plan” (EDAP) 
(European Commission, 2016/950 final) presented in November 2016. The Action 
Plan is structured around three areas: trigger the European Defence Fund; foster 
investments in the defence supply chain and strengthen the single market for 
defence (Idem, p. 5). The Plan also reminded the need to overcome inefficient 
spending and duplication and to solve problems of “lack of interoperability and 
technological gaps” (Idem, p. 3) essential to the set out of an effective PESCO. Being 
specialization, harmonization and pooling of capacities, one of the targets in PESCO 
the proposal to launch the “European Network of Defence-related Regions” will 
allow the European Commission to financially support regions with relevant indus-
18 What Barry Posen (2006, p. 173) refers as the “precipitating events”.
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trial and research capital, giving the incentive to the formation of “regional clusters 
of excellence” in support of the defence sector (Idem, p. 13)19. This is particularly 
relevant for Member States, which despite not having major industries, able to 
deliver high end defence related technologies and products may, with the adequate 
financial support, be able to develop research and capabilities necessary to the 
implementation of PESCO projects. As Biscop (2018) observes “any additional 
capacity that the European acquire thanks to PESCO, can still be deployed for 
operations in all possible frameworks: the EU itself, NATO and UN”. On July 2016, 
it was agreed the EU-NATO Joint Declaration followed in June 2018 by a joint 
follow up declaration20, completing a sequence of cooperative initiatives, bringing 
together the Council political representation and the EEAS diplomatic network, the 
Commission´s financial and regulative weigh and NATO’s operational credentials 
into the European defence agenda. 
The EUGS privileged Europe’s strategic autonomy through effective and timely 
response to external conflicts and crises; development of the EU’s capacities through 
better defence cooperation, leading to “interoperability, effectiveness, efficiency 
and trust” (EUGS, 2016) and protection of the Union and its citizens. In this last 
context, the European Defense Action Plan also aims at promoting civil/military 
synergies between defence matters and other Union’s policies, aiming at guaran-
teeing strategic autonomy by ensuring the “protection and resilience of critical 
European civil and military space infrastructure” and to “tackle growing security 
challenges”, especially those related to “border control”, “maritime surveillance” 
and “maritime security” (European Commission 2016/950, p. 18)
By the end of 2016, the European Council endorsed a “Defence Package” that 
comprised a common threefold understanding on: the European security and 
defence commitments, as agreed at 27 Member States with the EUGS; the “Euro-
pean Defence Action Plan”, which includes the European Defence Fund (EDF); 
and the cooperative initiatives approved in the context of EU-NATO relations 
that identified forty proposals organized in seven areas of cooperation including 
hybrid threats, operational cooperation, cyber security, defence capability industry, 
research, exercises and capacity building.
19 See European Network of Defence-related Regions (ENDR) aimed at bringing together regional 
authorities and clusters helping to develop dual-use strategies and providing access to EU 
funding, particularly to the benefit of small and medium size enterprises. Available at https://
www.endr.eu/about-us.
20 See Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, The President of the European 
Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2016. EU-
NATO Joint Declaration. Brussels, 8 July. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf.
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The unveiling of the European Defence Fund (European Commission 2017/295, 
p. 10)21 by the European Commission in June 2017, set the agreement on the creation 
of a joint funding mechanism that will help the development of a “capability pillar” 
necessary to PESCO implementation and the enhancing of European operational 
ability. Investments are to be coordinated on the base of the priorities identified by 
Member States such as: remotely piloted aircraft systems, air to air refueling, 
satellite communications and cyber domain22, which will “remain in the hands of 
Member States”(Idem, p. 3). The EDF is founded on two “legally distinct but 
complementary windows” coordinated by an overarching Coordination Board 
constituted by the European Commission, the High Representative, the Member 
States, the European Defence Agency and representatives of the industry compri-
sing EU supranational and intergovernmental bodies and non-governmental 
actors. The programmes in both windows (Research and Capabilities) are open to 
all the potential interested participants from Member States, including enterprises. 
The Research Window will finance collaborative research in defence products and 
technologies and it may include “projects developed in the framework of the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation” in line with defence capabilities priorities as 
previously agreed (Idem, p. 4). The EU defence research programme will be capa-
bility driven and will privilege “critical defence technologies” (Idem, p. 7). The 
funding is sourced in the EU budget under the next Multiannual Financial 
Framework and it should be operational by January 1st 2021. The Capability 
Window will provide support to the “joint development and joint acquisition of 
key defence capabilities” (Idem, p. 5). The funding in this case will come mainly 
from Member States through the European Defence Industrial Development 
Programme, which will make part of the Capability Window that integrates the 
European Defence Fund for the development phase of new European defence 
products and technologies. According to a European Parliament briefing docu-
ment23, during the negotiations between the Council, the Commission and the 
European Parliament that occurred between 15th March and 22nd May 2018, an agre-
ement24 on the majority of the goals and means proposed by the European Commis-
sion was reached. However, from the €500 million for the period from January 1st 
2019 to 31 December 2020, only €200 million will come from the EU budget and the 
remaining amount will be drawn from existing budget lines (European Parliament 
2018, p. 12). This will be beneficial to Member States, not only in terms of an addi-
tional financial incentives to defence cooperation in terms of capabilities, but also 
21 See also Council of the European Union (2016/34, p. 4).
22 See Council of the European Union (2013/217, §11).
23 See European Parliament (2018). 
24 See Council of the European Union (2018).
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on what regards the multiannual financial contributions to the EU overall budget, 
given that the EDF will not be entirely provide for by new financings, which would 
require an increase in budget contributions by Member States, but complemented 
with existent budget lines. 
The European Commission’s document on the European Defense Fund25 openly 
points out some of the difficulties regarding joint development and acquisition of 
defence capacities pertaining to the requirement to synchronize national defence 
planning and budget cycles, as well as to consider the risk taking factor that result 
from the “technical and financial risks that individual Member States may not be 
willing or able to take” (European Commission 2017/295 final, p. 8). A more consis-
tent and integrated European cooperation on development and acquisition of Euro-
pean capabilities, based on pooled financial contributions26 and advisory, adminis- 
trative and financial support by the European Commission will give the incentive to 
willing Member States to joint cooperative defence initiatives27. The advantages of 
this arrangement are three fold. It provides a solid startup financial base, offers better 
conditions for modernization of eligible industries and capability development, and 
facilitates access to wider markets, especially for small and medium size enterprises, 
offering the opportunity for jobs creation, foster scientific research and development 
of higher technical qualification on dual-use and defence capabilities. As Biscop 
(2017, p. 1) points out, bilateral cooperation among strong strategic and industrial 
capable Member States alone, will not be sufficient to “reach the critical mass of 
investors and customers needed to make a project economically viable”. Further, the 
financial toolbox, as suggested by EDF, by helping to support niches of specialization 
on defence products and technologies, through the European Network of Defence-
-related Regions, it may encourage existent clusters and induce the development of 
new regional clusters where a specific category of expertise is available or relevant to 
defence research and production, thus contributing to the use of funding for coope-
ration on what the Commission designates by “smart specialization”. 
25 The EDF was announced by Claude Juncker in his 2016 State of the Union address. See Euro-
pean Commission (2016). The Fund was also opportunity to contribute to the development of 
the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base through research and investments on 
defence capabilities.
26 These contributions will be “discounted from the structural fiscal effort expected to be accom-
plished” by each participant Member State. See European Commission (2017/295 final, foot-
note 15, p. 13).
27 The European Commission will constitute a Task Force which will assist and provide project-
specific input on the base of advisory support (standardization, legal compliance, planning 
and best practices); administrative help (meetings, secretariat support and information hub) 
and financial advantages (fund and assets management and debt issuance). See European 
Commission (2017, p. 19).
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From the strategic and operational point of view, in March 2017, the Council28 as 
part of the preparation for the implementation of the EU Global Strategy, a Concept 
Note on the operational planning and conduct capabilities for CSDP missions and 
operations, was agreed under the designation Military Planning and Conduct 
Capability (MPCC) (Council of the European Union 6881/2017). The MPCC is 
meant to offer a “permanent military planning and conduct capability at the mili-
tary strategic level and within the EEAS” (Idem, p. 7). This new body was placed 
within the EU Military Staff, directed by its Director General in order to improve 
civilian-military synergies and implement non-executive mission (mentoring, advi-
sing and monitoring). The Director of MPCC will retain command authority by 
transfer of authority from the contributing Member States involved in CSDP opera-
tions.
Having created the financial base leading to enhancing defence investments with 
EDF and the operational command structure to conduct CSDP operations, in line 
with the Civilian Planning Conduct and Capability and Military Planning Conduct 
and Capability within EEAS, the Council of European Union endorsed the proposal 
of an annual review of Member States defence commitments, putting some degree 
of political pressure on compliance. On the 6th March 2017 the Council endorsed 
modalities to establish the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) 
(Council of the European Union 110/2017) with the aim to further defence coope-
ration and promote a capability development methodology that could address 
european defence shortfalls and improve coherent in defence spending, under the 
principles of transparency and political commitment. CARD has a voluntary 
essence (Idem, §11) in full observation of commitments in terms of defence plan-
ning of Member States in the context of responsibilities of collective defence, in the 
framework of other organizations, especially NATO. At the European political 
level, CARD is supposed to offer “an overarching assessment on capability-related 
issues contributing to political guidance by the Council” (Council of the European 
Union 110/2017, §11) based on the information regarding Member States defence 
spending, their defence investments and state of national defence research initia-
tives provided on an annual review. At the strategic and operational levels, CARD 
is meant to streamline Member States spending and capability development on the 
base of the Capability Development Plan (CDP)29. A “trial run” methodology 
28 Council of the European Union (2017). See also Council of the European Union (2017/9178).
29 Since July 2008 the European Defence Agency has been taking the responsibility for gathering 
the inputs of participating Member States anticipating future capability needs together with 
the European Union Military Committee and EU Military Staff and the Council Secretariat, to 
identify opportunities to pool and collaborate, assess current and future operations, and to 
integrate technologies into military capabilities. See Fiott (2018).
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(Council of the European Union 2017/ 9178, §22), will allow Member States to test 
and validate CARD’s formulation, before its full implementation is to happen in 
the autumn 2019. In this context, the European Defence Agency was entrusted with 
collecting the relevant information regarding defence planning and spending, as 
well as the stages of implementation of the EU capability development, resulting 
from priorities set by the Capability Development Plan (CDP)30. In June 2018 a 
revised Capability Defence Plan was endorsed by the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) in line with the developments brought by the Security and Defense Imple-
mentation Plan, CARD, EDF and PESCO initiatives; with the identification of the 
domains of cooperation and with the evaluation by Members States, the EU Mili-
tary Committee and EU Military Staff on three levels that constitute the European 
Capability Development Priorities. The first, regards short-term assessment on 
lessons learnt from recent CSDP operations and identification of capacity shortfalls. 
The second, pertains to mid-term analysis of planned capabilities and future Euro-
pean defence opportunities for cooperation. The third concerns long term trends 
that will connect capability development, technological trends and industrial needs 
(European Defense Agency, 2018). 
PESCO: Willing and Binding Compliance in Defence Cooperation 
The European Union being a multilevel organization operates at different policy 
levels, based on a policy and security paradigm led by negotiation, confidence buil-
ding and cooperation, rather by the threat of confrontational use of force. This 
means that full formal transfer of decision making and policy implementation to 
the European level may not necessarily be a requisite in the field of security and 
defence31. On the contrary, by not having acquired yet that prerogative to decide 
and take action on behalf of Member States, but only by having achieved the 
competence to act commonly with their consent, Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) forges the conditions for willing compliance of participants on deci-
sion making and foreign, security and defence policy implementation. As Kaunert 
and Leonard (2013, p. 13) assert, policy formulation and implementation of policies 
“take place in Brussels by national and European civil servants, even if the compe-
30 The Capability Development Plan was initially agreed in 2008. By 2011 ten prioritized actions 
were approved by the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency: medical support; intel-
ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; counter improvised explosive devices; helicopters 
availability; cyber defence; logistic support; CSDP information exchange; strategic and tactical 
airlift management; fuel and energy and mobility assurance. See European Defence Agency 
(2011).
31 The transformation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDC) in 1999 into Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 2009, occurred without transfer of competences from 
Member States to the EU institutions.
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tencies continue to be the prerogative of member states”. The setting up of a Perma-
nent Structured Cooperation, as envisaged in 2009 in the Protocol 10 to the Lisbon 
Treaty and Articles 42(6) and 46, falls into this category of policy acting by willing 
compliance, based on binding commitments, without formal transfer of sovereignty 
competences to the EU on European defence32. Protocol 10 states that CSDP will be 
conducted on the base of “mutual political solidarity”, “identification of questions 
of general interest” and achievement of a higher “degree of convergence of Member 
States’ actions” and the Council and the High Representative shall ensure 
compliance with those principles. 
Despite the fact PESCO may fit into a categorization of cooperation by willing 
compliance, its developments in 2017 in its relation with the European Defence 
Fund would lead to an agreement on regulation for setting up the EDF under the 
2021-2027 multi-annual financial framework (European Commission, 2018, 476 
final) and the settlement of governance rules for PESCO projects and plans to 
implement defence initiatives (the National Implementation Plans) in terms of 
fostering spending for defence research and industrial development, helping to 
streamline the actors engagement, the financial support to defence cooperation, the 
procedures to further security and defence cooperation through an inclusive and 
flexible method of cooperation. 
On the other hand, on what regards CARD monitoring procedure by the European 
Council and the National Implementation Plans of PESCO by the European Defense 
Agency and European Commission may partially fall into a border line between 
intergovernmental decision making and implementation, and supranational ruling 
in financial terms. In its latest version of 2017, PESCO appears to fit into a more 
integrated model of defence policy, that blends willing compliance with a manda-
tory and legally binding approach (Council Decision, 2017/2315), in particular on 
the implementation phase, although still limited by operational criteria, in spite of 
its aggregative and inclusive nature.
In 2017, following the European Council of June, the High Representative, the 
Council, the Commission and the EU Member States showed a renewed interest on 
Permanent Structured Cooperation in a context of growing regionalization of poli-
cies and interests33. The fragmentation of threats and the consequences of budget 
constraints on capabilities, challenged the classical and conventional way of formu-
lating and implementing defence policies, leading to different forms of defence 
cooperation for instance under the format of defense clusters, which can be a good 
base of experience to establish PESCO34. In September a group of 23 Member States 
32 See also Fiott, Missiroli and Tardy (2017, pp. 44-46).
33 See Council of the European Union (2017).
34 On defence clusters see Drent, Zandee and Casteleijn (2014).
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presented a list of commitments in line with Protocol 10 of the TEU regarding 
investments, capability development and operational readiness in the areas of 
security and defence (Notification on PESCO 2017). The political intent to partici-
pate in PESCO was initially signed by 23 Member States through a common notifi-
cation presented to the Council and the High Representative on September 201735. 
On the 7th December, Portugal and Ireland notified the Council on their intention to 
join the common notification and on the 8th December the Council adopted a 
Council Decision formally establishing for the first time a Permanent Structured 
Cooperation and the list of Participating Member States (Council of the European 
Union 2017/14866). With PESCO, despite the fact “capabilities will remain owned 
and operated by Member States” as a “single set of forces” (Council of the Euro-
pean Union 2018 /10246)36 the Council agreement underlines that PESCO offers an 
inclusive arrangement of willing states to make “binding commitments and meet 
the criteria based on Article 42.6, 46 and Protocol 10 of the TEU” (Notification on 
PESCO 2017). The statement was meant to signal the Union’s interest in developing 
European defence as an intergovernmental policy, where Member States govern-
ments have the last word in political and operational terms, although bound by 
political commitments and operational criteria. The underpinning message was 
that of preservation of integrity of sovereign governance by participating Member 
States, bound by elements of selective operational eligibility and legally binding 
compromise. 
The Council Decision formalized the intent to establish PESCO; acknowledged the 
list the participating Member States and the projects on which Member States can 
take part; adopted the political process of governance for PESCO; set the supervi-
sion, reporting arrangements and financing procedures; identified the EU actors 
which will take part in PESCO arrangements and formalized the opportunity for 
participation of third States in individual projects. 
A few contending aspects can be found between the political purpose and framework 
of PESCO and its process of implementation, especially on the voluntary and 
binding essence of this cooperative process. Participation in PESCO is of voluntary 
nature, but the commitments agreed by Member States have a “binding” emphasis, 
remaining decision-making on the participant Member States. In the medium and 
35 According the TEU a common notification to the Council and HR is the first formal step to 
establish PESCO. The initial proposal was set in motion by Germany, Spain, France and Italy. 
The Council Decision approved on the 8th December 2018 foresees that in accordance with 
Article 46(3) of the TEU other states may later participate in PESCO. From the 27 Member 
States Denmark, due to the Treaty reserve invoked in 2007, does not take part of the defence 
dimension of CSDP and Malta.
36 Single set of forces it means that they can be made available to the EU, United Nations and 
NATO.
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long term, the non-implementation of commitments may result in some type of 
consequence in terms of “name and shame” or even loss of access to funding, but no 
further explicit consequences can be drawn from the policy documents37.
The Council Decision is clear on this matter by dissipating fears of loss of sove-
reignty over decisions with implications in the field of defence: “The decision of 
Member States to participate in PESCO is voluntary and does not in itself affect 
national sovereignty or the specific character of the security and defence policy of 
certain Member States” (Council of the European Union 2017/14866, p. 3). This 
means that not only it preserves the commitments assumed in the context of other 
international organizations, but participation in PESCO occurs also in conformity 
with their national legal system: “Contributions by the participating Member States 
to fulfil the more binding commitments under PESCO will be made in accordance 
with their applicable constitutional provisions” (Idem, ibidem). 
The main binding commitments regard “collaborative defence capability develop-
ment projects”, being the financing of these projects supported by the Union’s 
budget (Idem, p. 3), consequently sourced and managed by the European Commis-
sion, a supranational body of the Union38. The administrative expenditures of the 
European Union institutions and those that will fall over the EEAS, regarding the 
implementation of the Council Decisions, will be “charged to the Union budget”. 
The “administrative expenditures of the EDA” will be draw from the “financing 
rules of the EDA” in accordance with the Council Decision (2015/1835)39. Whereas 
the operational expenditures that result from projects “shall be supported prima-
rily by the participating Member States that take part in an individual project” 
(Idem, Article 8 (2)), which means that costs fall where they lie. This in itself already 
poses a limitation to participation, due to the fact not all willing Member States, 
will be able to take part in PESCO projects or to achieve significant progress, as 
referred on the respective National Implementation Plans, but perhaps only those 
financially and strategically more robust are able to meet the more demanding 
criteria.
The Council Decision when referring to the establishment of PESCO limits it to a 
conditionality pertaining to the participation of Member States “whose military 
capabilities fulfil higher criteria” (Council of the European Union, 2017/14866) 
37 In the short term it is not foreseeable that commitments assumed in the context of defense 
related projects financing will be object of what Schimmelfennig (2017, p. 10) “collective finan-
cial liabilities” for participant Member States as it is the case in the European economic, mon-
etary and budgetary domains.
38 See Lavallée (2011, p. 373 and p. 381).
39 As referred in the Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315. See Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/18835 
defining the statute, seat and operational rule of the European Defence Agency. Official Journal 
of the European Union 266, 13.10.2015, p. 55
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following the provisions adopted by Article 1 of Protocol 10. This in practical terms 
limits PESCO not only to the military dimension of CSDP, but again to those 
Member States which are willing, but also strategically and operationally more able 
and capable. 
Conversely to the original PESCO version of 2007 (TEU, Protocol 10, Article 2) and 
in order to strengthen the binding nature of the commitments assumed by partici-
pant Member States, PESCO in 2017, despite underlining the voluntary nature 
(Council of the European Union 2017/14866, §4, p. 3), it also specifies the require-
ments attached to a list of binding commitments annexed to the Council Decision 
establishing PESCO (Idem, Article 3, §1 and Annex pp. 1-6). The Decision deter-
mines the mode and periodicity of compliant practice with the “more binding 
commitments” assumed by Member States. The mode takes the form of National 
Implementation Plans “in which they [Member States] are to outline how they will 
meet the more binding commitments, specifying how they will fulfil the more 
precise objectives that are to be set at each phase” (Idem, Article 3, §2). The National 
Implementation Plans are to be communicated to PESCO Secretariat, monitored by 
EDA on defense investments and capability development and by the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), including the EU Military Staff on what concerns 
operational aspects. They will produce a joint assessment to be delivered to the 
Political and Security Committee, which will take a PESCO format40. The result of 
the supervision and monitoring of the National Implementation Plans by these five 
bodies will be of common knowledge to all the participant Member States, which in 
case commitments are not fulfilled may generate problems of trust on the political 
and strategical reliability. On what concerns periodicity, the National Implementa-
tion Plans shall be submitted to revision on an annual base.
The binding principles to which Member States are to be bounded included five 
major commitments based on “collective benchmarks” (Council Decision (CFSP) 
2017/2315), as identified and agreed upon in 2007. First, the commitment to increase 
investment expenditure on defence up to 20% of total defence spending in order to 
“fill strategic capability gaps”, in line with the Coordinated Annual Review and to 
increase up to 2% in defence research and technology (Idem, p. 62). Second, line up 
defence apparatus by harmonizing needs, pooling capabilities and specializing 
means and capabilities. Specialization does not mean that Member States will quit 
on having the full spectrum of means and capabilities they need, but rather that 
they may invest on capabilities where they can deliver a better output in terms of 
defence research, technologies, industries or strategic ability at the political-stra-
tegic or operational level. This is not a novelty in itself, considering that some 
Member States have already offered in the past specialized capabilities without 
40 See Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, Annex III, §4.1.
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losing political or strategic autonomy41. In this cooperative context, the European 
Defense Fund may offer the financial incentive to improve capabilities, whereas 
CARD may keep participating Member States aligned with the necessary capability 
development benchmark to meet the output criteria targeted by PESCO initiative. 
The third commitment regards the availability of necessary capabilities in accor-
dance with the existent treat level and required interoperability among Member 
States and with strategic partners. This will facilitate deployability, efficiency and 
operational output in different operational contexts in the protection of European 
interests in the near neighbourhood and in the far security border. The fourth 
commitment concerns working together to overcome perceived shortfalls in the 
framework of the “Capability Development Plan”. The fifth and last commitment 
respects to participation of participants Member States in collaborative projects of 
the European Defence Agency, based on European equipment programmes that 
can fill shortages and help to develop the European Defense Technological and 
Industrial Base (EDTIB).
Despite the voluntary nature to participate in PESCO, once contributions are 
pledged they are binding and subject to monitorization and obligation to imple-
ment. A sanction process is foreseen, in case compliance with contributions is not 
met. The Council Decision (CFSP 2017/2315, Annex III), in accordance with Article 
46(4) of the Lisbon Treaty, foresees the suspension of Member States who are no 
longer able or willing to fulfill higher criteria, in order to ensure a coherent and 
credible implementation of PESCO. Participation in PESCO according to the 
Council Decision (CFSP, 2017/2315)42 is “voluntary”, maintaining “national sove-
reignty untouched”, being established in “full compliance with the provisions of 
the TEU and the protocols attached and respecting constitutional provisions of 
member States”. Compliance will be bound by political willingness and national 
interest/gain of participant Member States and by solidarity with cooperative prac-
tice regarding European defence. As Coelmont (2017) observes “in the end PESCO 
is about 100% national sovereignty coupled with 100 % European solidarity”. 
On the 14th December 2017 the Council Decision establishing PESCO was published 
in the Official Journal of the European Union, where legislative acts are translated 
into guidelines and harmonized norms and rules with a view to informal adoption 
or formal transposition into national legal context. The Council Decisions gathers 
both the Notification on PESCO, addressed to the Council and the High Represen-
41 That was the case of Germany with its strategic mobility assets, The Netherlands with preci-
sion-guided munitions, Czech Republic with its special anti-chemical and nuclear warfare unit 
or Spain with its air-to-air refueling capacity, which can be place at the service of various mul-
tinational force configurations.
42 See also Official Journal of the European Union L.331/57, 14 December 2017, Annex I, p. 70.
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tative, and the Council Decision establishing PESCO43. Five principles guiding 
PESCO (Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, Annex I) can be identified: conditional 
eligibility, compliance, flexibility, inclusiveness and complementarity. On condi-
tional eligibility, this principle is based on the concept of higher strategic and mili-
tary output, in close connection with the principle of inclusiveness of Member 
States and third countries, notably NATO or the departing United Kingdom. 
Compliance and flexibility are principles with a focus on European internal output, 
thus strengthening the Union’s consistency and coherence between principles and 
actions in security and defence. With the principle of legal compliance, “PESCO 
offers a reliable and binding legal framework within the EU institutional framework” 
conform to the EU Treaty and the constitutional setting of each Member State 
(Idem). The principle of flexibility contributes to the principle of inclusiveness, 
empowering the European Union to reach the level of ambition as outlined in the 
EU Global Strategy: to protect European citizens, to increase capacities and readi-
ness in response to crises and to promote better relations with neighbours and stra-
tegic partners44. On the principle of complementarity PESCO is introduced as a 
framework that will strengthen “defence capabilities of the EU Member States 
(and) will also benefit NATO” (Idem). The Council Decision stresses this benefit by 
adopting a very conservative tone, which characterized the initial stages of the then 
European Security and Defence Identity in late 90’s, by recovering the expression a 
“European pillar within the Alliance” that helps responding to the demand for a 
more efficient transatlantic burden sharing, eventually to appease those Member 
States that will only commit to European defence, if that will not jeopardize their 
transatlantic interests (Biscop, 2017). 
The formal establishment of PESCO led to the setting up of a governance mecha-
nism where the Council (Idem, Article 4, §2, p. 8) provides: “strategic direction and 
guidance”; follows the fulfilment of commitments for the periods 2018-2020 and 
2021-2025; identifies the objectives necessary to efficient accomplishment of the 
commitments undertaken and assesses the contributions of participating Member 
43 Agreed respectively on the 13th November and 11th December were published in the Official 
Journal of the European Union on the 14th December 2017.
44 An element that may strengthened the requirement for a better connection between internal 
and external security lies on the development of a Civilian CSDP Compact, as endorsed by the 
European Council on 14th December 2017. A Civilian Capability Development Plan is envis-
aged to be agreed in June 2018, followed by a final agreement on a Civilian CSDP Compact in 
November 2018, reinforcing the commitment to the EU’s joined up approach as presented by 
the EU Global Strategy. During the European Council of December 2017, the High Representa-
tive was invited to report on the Summer 2018 on the developments made on the consultation 
process with the Member States and European Commission on a Civilian CSDP Compact, see 
Council of the European Union (2017 EUCO19/17) and Taitto (2017).
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States to fulfill the agreed commitments, according to the mechanism described in 
Article 6” (Idem, §2(d)), which are those of “unity, consistency and effectiveness of 
PESCO” (Article 6, §1). The Council also holds the responsibility for establishing 
the list of projects to be developed under PESCO framework. 
Following the Council Decision of the 6th March 2018, establishing the list of projects 
to be developed under PESCO, project members will have to define objectives and 
timelines for each project, as well as the roles and responsibilities of each Member 
State. During the European Council of June 2018, it was agreed to assess the progress 
of the current seventeen PESCO projects and to call, in a rather surprising manner, 
to a “second wave of PESCO projects”. Further a new Council Decision is expected 
to be issued in November 2018 on the “exceptional participation in PESCO projects” 
(Council of the European Union 2018/10246) of third countries. This pressure for an 
agreement on a second wave of new projects can be counterproductive considering 
that the initial stage of PESCO is still under way and a call to assess progress and 
implementation of the first seventeen projects is on. Participation in PESCO should 
not be regarded as a doing by decree project. It is a rather complex enterprise that 
touches core domains of states’ sovereignty, with a likely potential to fall victim of 
the particularities of national interests of Member States. It is a matter that involves 
political will, like minded strategic outlooks, similar security and defence cultures, 
structural availability of funding, adequate military capabilities and also industrial 
and technological capacity. To cooperate in capabilities development in order to 
make them more deployable, interoperable, sustainable and effective involves an 
accurate assessment on the current international environment, a validation of 
Member States solidarity and a long term commitment to defence cooperation on 
how and with what are Member States willing and able to guarantee the security 
and defence of collective interests. Considering that the majority of current CSDP 
actions are of civilian nature, a closer cooperation between internal and external 
security must be taken into consideration and PESCO should be a relevant part of 
this equation. The strengthening of the civilian dimension of CSDP, with the agree-
ment on a Civilian CSDP Compact (Council of the European Union 2017/19) is 
already awkwardly drawing from the short experience achieved with collaborative 
defence projects from which only a few are dual use. It will be interesting to follow 
how much dual use interface there will be between civilian and military Capability 
Development Plans and how much the EU Global Strategy call for a “EU strategic 
approach to resilience” (European Commission and High Representative, 2017/21 
final) and rapid response will translate into EU initiatives and how crisis manage-
ment will not be replaced, but rather complemented by a common defence project45. 
45 See European Political Strategy Centre (2017).
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If the European Union will be able to develop civilian and military initiatives in a 
true joined-up approach46, it will have to improve opportunities for European and 
Member-State’s actors responsible for the internal dimensions of security and 
justice to work closely with those responsible for CSDP. The combined efforts 
between preventive and reactive EU policies, instruments and capabilities will be 
the test case for future CSDP or for a more effective international role for the Euro-
pean Union.
On what regards cooperation with third countries, notably with the UK, their parti-
cipation on European defence initiatives, namely through PESCO, will only rein-
force this initiative if their commitment is a long term compromise and not a pledge 
conditioned by the less favourable developments of their national policies or by the 
internal peculiarities of national party politics, with a negative impact on the future 
of the European project and political solidarity.
Conclusion
European defense cooperation comes at a time when multilateralism is relentlessly 
contested and international cooperation dismissed from the foreign policy agenda 
by a few major international players. Despite the apparent unfavourable context, 
recent European defence cooperation signals three singular developments. First, it 
marks some degree of unprecedented internal commonality of views, among EU 
Member States, on a policy domain that traditionally rests close to states sovereign 
attributes. This has been signalled in different ways with the identification of clear 
framing goals that will guide European defence (protect European citizens, respond 
to crisis, develop cooperative regional order with partners), together with the func-
tional targets of rationalisation, synchronization, harmonization, specialization and 
interoperability. Commonality of views is also expressed on the processes of finan-
cial and political governance and on the definition of strategic priorities that will 
guide European capability development, offering an indication of a common asses-
sment of the challenges ahead. Second, it was able to generate within the EU and 
among transatlantic allies (the US excluded) a collective sense of necessity to coope-
46 In 2011 in a pioneer work, the EU Political and Security Committee invited the Crisis Manage-
ment Planning Directorate to draw together with the representatives of the EEAS bodies, the 
European Commission and the Chairman of the COSI Support Group a Road Map document 
aiming at identify lines of action within specific areas and the correspondent stakeholders nec-
essary to develop ways to strengthen ties between CSDP and FSJ domains. The result was the 
identification of 27 lines of action in 5 specific domains (Comprehensive Situational Awareness 
and Intelligence Support to the EU; Exchange of Information and Mutual Support; Improving 
Mechanisms in the Decision-Making Process; Improving Cooperation in Planning EU External 
Action and Capabilities: Human Resources and Training). See Council of the European Union 
(2011/15562). 
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rate, rather than the privilege of choosing to do so, with effective cooperation initia-
tives already under development between the EU and NATO. Third, it happens 
following the introduction of the EU Global Strategy, that despite the fact it was not 
endorsed by the Council, it was able to mobilize the will and to set the basic 
framework of dialogue for future European defense cooperation.
After June 2016, an Implementation Plan on Security and Defense, a Defence Action 
Plan, a plan to further develop capabilities and a European Defence Fund were set 
off to strengthen European defence, mobilising the political will, the necessary 
funding and the availability of European and national public and private actors 
essential to this endeavour. Simultaneously, the EU-NATO joint initiative offers a 
singular opportunity to improve interoperability and create better synergies 
between both organizations. The European reiteration that defence capabilities will 
not be developed at the expenses of a weaker transatlantic alliance nor with heavier 
costs to the Member States budgets, makes the idea politically appealing, economi-
cally more viable and from the research and innovation point of view an interesting 
opportunity for the industrial sector.
Similarly, the investments to be made on European defence according to a set of 
strategic priorities, not only resonate the interests of EU Member States, but of 
those who are also transatlantic allies, by helping to meet the challenges of hybrid 
threats, in the cyber domain, on fight against terrorism and in crisis response, not 
only with better cooperation, but also with more integrated education, training, 
confidence building and capabilities development.
The EUGS departing from its “principled pragmatism” paved the way for an 
approach to European foreign policy based on the acknowledgment that Europe 
has interests, that “defense matters” and that cooperation is a necessity in foreign 
policy and an opportunity to enhance capabilities and develop national and Euro-
pean research, technologies and industries. This may be a reason why European 
defence cooperation can be said to be a transformative project that in the end will 
benefit small, medium and large Member States and defense stakeholders of 
various scales.
European defence cooperation is not only about strategic approach, funding and 
technological developments. It is also about fostering political will, trust and 
common support to a more rational manner of managing security and defence 
needs and resources, with the joint effort of European actors, Member States and 
that of strategic partners like NATO.
From an implementation point of view, European defence cooperation offers a 
blend of two sets of orders. On the one hand, an order made of constitutive norms 
of willing compliance, respectful of Member States constitutional orders and of 
their international and bilateral commitments. On the other, a regulative order 
based on legally binding responsibilities supervised by European bodies, on the 
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base of regular reviews of foreign, security and defense decisions and actions of 
Member States. This means not only an opportunity for more integrated decision 
making and shaping, more financial governance for defence, but also more internal 
and international responsibility for Member States on European defense. The EU 
with its “Defense Package” appears to be evolving to a more integrated model of 
defence policy that blends willing compliance with a mandatory and legally 
binding approaches, in particular on the implementation phases, although still 
limited by operational criteria, in spite of its much announced inclusive character.
The test case for any defense project does not arise from circumstances of unity, but 
from when internal and external challenges call for decisions and actions at the 
high end of international politics, in crisis and conflict prevention and immediate 
response. 
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